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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking observations in consumer markets is the existence of substantial
price dispersion for seemingly identical products. In his classic model of sales, Varian
(1980) shows how price dispersion in a homogeneous-product market arises due to the
presence of consumers who are uninformed about market prices. Price-setting rms balance
their incentives to compete for the informed consumers who will pay the lowest price and
to exploit the uninformed consumers who each purchase from a randomly selected seller,
producing an equilibrium price distribution.1 The behavior of the uninformed consumers
can be justied as their having prohibitively high search cost to nd the price of a second
seller. Alternatively, as Ellison (2006) notes, the uniformed consumers in Varians model
can be viewed as being boundedly rationaltheir reservation price is not derived optimally
from the equilibrium price distribution.
An alternative approach to understanding price dispersion is through models of optimal
search. Stahl (1989) considers a model that is similar to Varian (1980) except that all
the uninformed consumers search optimally given their (not too high) search cost. In
equilibrium, rms price according to a probability distribution function (much as in Varian);
the informed consumers (whom Stahl calls shoppers who have zero search cost) will pay
the lowest price, whereas the uninformed consumers will engage in optimal price search,
sampling sellers sequentially with an optimal reservation price. An important contribution
of the paper is to bridge the Bertrand equilibrium of marginal cost pricing and the Diamond
equilibrium of monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971) in a unied model of optimal consumer
search: equilibrium prices monotonically increase in consumer search cost and converge to
marginal cost when search cost goes to zero, whereas the Diamond outcome obtains in the
limit when the portion of consumers with strictly positive search costs approaches 1.
While these two inuential papers and the related literature have o¤ered signicant in-
sights on equilibrium price competition and dispersion,2 the startling di¤erent behaviors of
1See also Rosenthal (1980) for a related original contribution.
2The literature on price dispersion that originates from Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980) has come
to be known as the clearinghouse approach, after the more general model of Baye and Morgan (2001), as
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the uninformed consumers in the two models are perhaps best viewed as capturing di¤erent
aspects of the reality: although some consumers may conduct optimal sequential search,
who anticipate correctly the equilibrium price distribution and set an optimal reservation
price, there may also be other consumers who behave as the uninformed consumers in
Varian (1980), searching with a limited scope. It would be desirable to incorporate these
heterogeneous searchers in a unied and yet tractable model.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of oligopolistic pricing in homogeneous-
product markets with heterogeneous searchers. Each consumer demands at most one unit
of the product. As in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), some consumers are informed and
will purchase from the seller with the lowest price, while others are uninformed about mar-
ket prices. The uninformed consumers will search for price information: some of whom
are what we shall call global searchers, who search sequentially with recall (as in Stahl,
1989) following some optimal reservation price; whereas the others are what we shall call
local searchers who search only once. As in Varian, the local searchers can be viewed ei-
ther as optimizing agents having prohibitively high cost for searching beyond once,3 or as
boundedly rational (henceforth BR) searchers whose reservation price is not derived from
the equilibriuum price distribution and hence may not be optimal.4 When all uninformed
consumers are local searchers, our model reduces to that of Varian (1980); when all unin-
formed consumers are global searchers, the model is the same as Stahl (1989).5 By varying
opposed to the approach of optimal (sequential) search with strategic rms that Stahl (1989) examplies (see
Reinganum, 1979 for another original contribution. Search models with xed sample sizes include Burdett
and Judd, 1983; and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2004). Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) provides an
excellent review of the literature.
3With this interpretation, our model is complementary to Stahl (1996), which considers search costs
that follow an absolutely continuous distribution. Our model serves to unify the two approaches of Varian
(1980) and Stahl (1989) in a tractable model and enables us to derive some sharper predictions that are not
available when the search costs are continuous.
4The local searchers can also be boundedly rationality due to their loyalty to a particular seller, as in
Rosenthal (1980). Our analysis remains valid with this alternative interpretation of the local searchers.
5Stahl (1989) considers a downward-sloping demand curve for each consumer. For convenience, we assume
unit demand, but our analysis can be extended to admit elastic demand.
3
the uninformed consumers between these two types and by allowing both interpretations
of the local searchers, our model combines the two approaches and provides a convenient
framework to study how heterogeneity among searchers a¤ects equilibrium outcomes.
In equilibrium, there is price dispersion due to rms adopting mixed strategies, and
the nature of the equilibrium depends on how the local searchersreservation price di¤ers
from a benchmark the optimal reservation price by global searchers if there were no local
searchers. If local searchersreservation price exceeds the benchmark by a large amount, the
equilibrium is a mixture distribution, where rms randomize between a high-price distrib-
ution and a low-price distribution, placing zero probability on an interval of intermediate
prices. By adopting this clustered pricing strategy, rms swing between targeting the local
searchers and global searchers, and equilibrium prices are higher in this case than if there
were no local searchers. Another interesting feature of the equilibrium in this region of
parameter values is that, unlike in Stahl (1989), global searchers may indeed search more
than once and hence there is true equilibrium sequential search.
If local searchersreservation price departs from (either exceeding or falls short of) the
benchmark by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium has the feature familiar in the
literature, with an equilibrium price distribution that has positive density on the entire
support. Remarkably, the presence of local searchers will have no e¤ect on equilibrium
outcomes when their reservation price exceeds the benchmark by a relatively small amount,
but will lower equililbrium prices if their reservation price is below the benchmark by any
small amount.
Our analysis also reveals some intriguing comparative statics. Unlike Stahl (1989), which
predicts that prices monotonically decrease as search costs become lower, in our model
prices can increase as the search cost for the global searchers decreases, holding other
parameters of the model constant. When the equilibrium involves a mixture distribution,
a lower search cost would lower the global searchersoptimal reservation price, making it
less protable for rms to target them. Consequently, rms increase the probability of
choosing high prices that target the local searchers, resulting in higher expected prices in
the market. Furthermore, as this search cost goes to zero, global searchers reservation
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price will approach zero and they will e¤ectively search all sellers; but equilibrium price
dispersion persists. In fact, in this case the equilibrium price distribution converges to that
of Varian (1980) with the mass of uninformed consumers equal to that of local searchers.
Our ndings o¤er a simple explanation of the puzzling observations that prices for many
products do not seem to be lower on the Internet than in conventional markets and that
substantial price dispersion remains in the Internet market, although Internet appears to
have substantially lowered search cost.6 We may consider the local searchers in our model
as those who have high search cost, because they lack the access to the low-cost search
technology made possible by the Internet (e.g., they may not have a computer or may not
have Internet access). Then, the low search cost to nd prices through the Internet need
not reduce prices and reduce price dispersion.7 In this sense, the Digital Divide" not only
raises an equity issue, it also has important implications for market e¢ ciency. Our model
thus complements other recent studies that o¤er alternative explanations (e.g., Baye and
Morgan, 2001; Baye and Morgan, 2004; and Ellison and Ellison, 2008).
We have formulated our model deliberately to allow for the interpretation of local searchers
both as fully-optimizing consumers with prohibitively high search cost or as BR consumers
whose reservation price departs from the optimum. This second interpretation is related to
a small but growing literature that models bounded rationality in the study of industrial
organization.8 As in the literature, the BR consumers in our model can have either positive
or negative externalities on the rational consumers. However, in our model a relatively
small departure by some consumers from optimizing behavior either does not a¤ect the
equilibrium or benets all consumers, including the BR consumers themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Sections 3
characterizes equilibrium price distribution. Section 4 analyzes comparative statics. Section
6See, for example, Baye and Morgan (2004), Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006), and Ellison and Ellison
(2005) for discussions of evidence.
7Similarly, if local searchers are boundedly rational, the low search cost on the Internet need not reduce
prices and price dispersion.
8See Armstrong and Chen (2009), Baye and Morgan (2004), Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
and Spiegler (2006) for examples of recent work, and Ellison (2006) for an insightful review of the literature.
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5 discusses the implications of considering local searchers as BR consumers. Section 6
concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2. THE MODEL
There are N  2 rms, producing a homogeneous product with a constant marginal
cost that is normalized to zero. Firms simultaneously and independently set their prices.
As in the literature, we will consider only symmetric equilibrium and assume that each
rm randomly chooses a price from a probability distribution function: if the distribution
function reduces to a single point, then each rm chooses a pure strategy; otherwise the
rm adopts a mixed strategy.
The market has a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of the product valued
at V . They make choices after rms set prices. Portion  2 (0; 1) of the consumers are
informed about all rmsprices in the market,9 whereas portion 1    of the consumers
are (initially) uninformed about prices in the market. The informed consumers will always
buy from a seller with the lowest price, while the uninformed consumers will engage in
price search. As is commonly assumed in the literature, the rst search has zero cost but
each additional search incurs a positive search cost. Portion  2 [0; 1] of the uninformed
consumers are global searchers, who conduct optimal search sequentially with recall and
with search cost s > 0; portion 1    are local searchers who will only search one seller
and purchase if the price does not exceed their reservation price b. As in Varian (1980),
the local searchers can be viewed as optimal searchers with a su¢ ciently high search cost
whose reservation price is b = V; or as BR searchers who also have search cost s but have
chosen a resesrve price b that is not derived from the equilibrium price distribution. With
the second interpretation, we assume b 2 (bm; V ]; where bm  s is a parameter of the model
that will be dened later.10 The global searchers are the same as the sequential searchers
9As Stahl (1989) suggests, these can be consumers who have zero search cost and even enjoy shopping
around.
10As we shall see later, the restriction on b > bm allows us to focus on situations where local searchers will
indeed search only once in equilibrium under reservation price b. We note that with reservation price b 2
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in Stahl (1989).
The key parameters of our model are b; ; ; and s; with V being su¢ ciently high relative
to s: A (symmetric) equilibrium is a price distribution function  (p) and a reservation price
r by the global searchers such that, given r; b; and other rms adopting  (p) ; it is optimal
for each rm to choose  (p) ; and given  (p) ; it is optimal for global searchers to search
sequentially with reservation price r:
By familiar arguments (e.g., Varian, 1980; and Stahl, 1989), the game has no pure-
strategy equilibrium, and the equilibrium price distribution  (p) is atomless on its entire
support.
Denote the upper limit of the support for  (p) by p^: Then, p^  max fb; rg ; since a rm
will earn zero prot by pricing abovemax fb; rg : Also, p^  min fb; rg ; since if p^ < min fb; rg ;
a rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at min fb; rg as pricing
at p^: Furthermore, it cannot be true that min fb; rg < p^ < max fb; rg ; because if it were
the case, a rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at max fb; rg as
pricing at p^. We thus have:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the upper limit of the support for  (p) is either the local searchers
reservation price b or the global searchersreservation price r.
Before proceeding to the analysis of our model, we discuss two of its special cases. If
 = 0; then our model reduces to that of Varian (1980), where all the uninformed consumers
purchase from a randomly selected seller if the price does not exceed their reserve price b:
The equilibrium price distribution in this case is
F v (p) = 1 

1  
N
(
b
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
with
1  
1 + (N   1)b  p  b; (1)
where the superscript v means that the distribution is the same as that in Varian (1980).
If  = 1; then our model reduces to that of Stahl (1989); the equilibrium price distribution
(bm; V ]; local searchers are not irrational, but are boundedly rational, since any b 2 (bm; V ] is rationalizable
under some market price distribution.
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and reservation price by the global searchers are uniquely given by, respectively:
G(p; rg) = 1 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
with
1  
1 + (N   1)rg  p  rg; (2)
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
(rg   p)dG(p; rg) = s; (3)
provided that rg  V: All rms simultaneously choose prices according to c.d.f. G (p; rg) ;
and all uninformed consumers search sequentially with recall under the optimally chosen
reservation price rg; stopping search only when she has found a price p  rg or when she
has searched all sellers (and will purchase from the seller with the lowest price). SinceZ rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
(rg   p)dG(p; rg) =
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp! 0 as rg ! 0;
and the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (3) with respect to rg is
1 +
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
dG(p; rg)
dp

  p
rg

dp > 1 
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
dG(p; rg)
dp
dp = 0; (4)
rg  V is satised when s is small relative to V , which we assume throughout our analy-
sis.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3), we have:
@rg
@
< 0 and
@rg
@s
> 0: (5)
That is, if all uninformed consumers are global searchers, their optimal reservation price
decreases in the portion of informed consumers but increases in the search cost.
3. EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISTRIBUTION
This section characterizes the equilibrium price distribution, which depends importantly
on how b di¤ers from rg: We shall divide the possible values of b into three connected and
mutually exclusive regions: (i) b > rg1  ; (ii)
rg
1   b  rg; and (iii) rg > b > bm; where bm
is the lower bound on b that we will dene later in equation (14).
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The analysis for cases (i) and (ii), for which b  rg; is valid whether the local searchers
are rational consumers with high search cost or BR consumers who happen to set their
reservation price above rg: The introdution of the local searchers into the Stahl model
(i.e., the model with  = 1) in these cases introduces a reason why sellers might want to
deviate from the Stahl equilibrium and set a higher price (in an attempt to rip o¤ these
local searchers). In case (i), 1    > rg=b; so there are relatively many local searchers.
Proposition 1 will show that sellers mix between setting high prices to take advantage of
the large fraction of local searchers and setting low prices to attract the global searchers.
In case (ii), 1     rg=b; so there are relatively few local searchers, and there is thus a
small incentive to deviate to a high price. Proposition 2 will show, perhaps surprisingly,
that the presence of such local searchers will have no e¤ect whatsoever the equilibrium
distribution is exactly as in Stahl.
The analysis for case (iii), for which b < rg  V; will be relevant only if we interpret
the local searchers as BR consumers: The introduction of the local searchers into the Stahl
model in this case introduces a reason for the sellers to lower prices; a strictly positive mass
of prices o¤ered in the Stahl model would be rejected by local searchers. As Proposition
3 will show, this leads sellers to set prices less than b; which is also less than the global
searchersreservation price. So global searchers act like local searchers and the equilibrium
becomes that of Varian (1980).
We now formally present our results, starting with the case when b exceeds rg by a large
amount: b > 11 rg:
Proposition 1 When b > 11 rg; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which
each rm prices according to mixed strategy
F (p;; rf ) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  )F1 (p;) if t1  p < rf
(1  ) if rf  p < t2
1  + F2 (p;) if t2  p  b
; (6)
and global searchers adopt reservation price rf ; where t1 < rf < t2 < b;
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F1(p;) =
1
1  
8<:1 
"
(1  ) (1  )
N

b
p
  1

   (1  )
 
1  N
N (1  )
# 1
N 1
9=; ; (7)
F2(p;) = 1  1


(1  ) (1  )
N (+  (1  ))(
b
p
  1)
 1
N 1
; (8)
t1 = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  ) ; (9)
t2 = b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +NN 1 (+   ) ; (10)
and  2 (0; 1) and rf satisfy
rf = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1 ; (11)
(1  )
Z rf
t1
(rf   p)dF1(p;) = s: (12)
Each rms equilibrium prot is b (1 )(1 )N : Furthermore, rf > rg; and F (p; ) < G (p; )
so that both the expected price and the expected minimum price in the market are higher
under F (p; ) than under G (p; ) : Local searchers have lower expected surplus than global
searchers, and welfare of all consumers is lower when  < 1 than when  = 1:
The equilibrium, illustrated in Example 1, has several interesting features:
First, the equilibrium price distribution is a mixture distribution consisting of two sepa-
rate cumulative distribution functions, F1(p;) and F2(p;); playing them randomly with
respective probabilities 1  and ; and a gap exists between the upper limit of the support
for F1 and the lower limit of the support for F2. Both  and rf are functions of b and are
determined endogenously. In equilibrium, with probability ; each rm will price above
rf according to c.d.f. F2; and in doing so it targets the local searchers (and can sell to
the other consumers only when the other rm has also priced above rf ): With probability
1   ; each rm will price below rf according to c.d.f. F1: Given the reservation price rf
of the global searchers, a rm is guaranteed to sell to at least 1N of them if pricing at rf ;
the upper limit of the support for F1; whereas with a slight increase of the price above rf it
will lose sales to all the global searchers if another rm prices at or below rf ; which occurs
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with probability 1   N 1 > 0: Thus, the lower limit of support for F2; which achieves
the same expected prot as b (the upper limit of the support for both F2 and F ); must be
discretely higher than rf : when raising its price above rf ; a rms demand jumps down,
which must be exactly o¤set by a jump-up of the price so that the rms expected prot
remains the same. Consequently, an interval of prices (rf < p < t2) on the support of the
equilibrium distribution F will be played with zero probability. This clustered equilibrium
price distribution is in sharp contrast to the unclustered price distribution in the literature.
Second, in equilibrium, since both rms will price above rf with a positive probability;
global searchers may search more than once before purchasing; so there is true equilibrium
sequential search. This is in contrast to Stahl (1989), where in equilibrium all searchers
only search once before purchase.
Example 1 Suppose that N = 3;  = 0:5;  = 0:5; s = 0:5:Then rg = 1: 26, and 11 rg = 2:
53: Let b = 5: Figure 1 shows the density function of the equilibrium price distribution:
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 1
Third, the connement to searching only one seller is costly to the local searchers, making
their expected surplus lower than that of the global searchers. This is true because local
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searchers pay a higher expected price given the equilibrium price distribution, compared to
the global searchers who have a lower reservation price. Moreover, the existence of local
searchers is the reason that sellers set higher prices to begin with.
Finally, the presence of local searchers exerts a negative externality on the global searchers
and the informed consumers by raising the expected prices they will pay.
We next consider the case where b exceeds rg by a relatively small amount.
Proposition 2 When rg  b  11 rg; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in
which rms set prices according to G(p; rg), and global searchers adopt reservation price
rg: Each rms equilibrium prot is
1 
N rg: In equilibrium, local searchers have the same
expected surplus as global searchers, and the presence of local searchers has no e¤ect on the
equilibrium outcome.
Remarkably, when the local searchersreservation price exceeds rg by a relatively small
amount (which can be large if  is large), their presence has no e¤ect on the equilib-
rium price distribution, which remains to be G (p; rg) ; same as if all searchers were global
searchers. Thus Stahl (1989)s analysis is robust even in the presence of such local searchers.
Intuitively, although the local searchers reservation price exceeds that of the low-cost
searchers, since the di¤erence is relatively smalleither because b is close to rg or because 
is large, rmsprice strategy is driven by the consideration of global searchersreservation
price. Consequently, the local searchers have the same expected search outcomes as global
searchers. Firm conduct and market performance are not a¤ected by their presence. The
global searchers exert a positive externality on the local searchers: rms do not want to
lose sales to the global searchers by pricing above rg; which, given that rg  b; means that
having the reservation price at b is equivalent to setting it at rg in equilibrium. Example 2
below illustrates the equilibrium price distribution in Proposition 2.
Example 2 Everything is the same as in Example 1 except 1: 26  b  2:53: Figure 2
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shows the density function of the equilibrium price distribution:
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 2
Finally, we consider the case where b is lower than rg: For b < rg; let rh  rh (b) satisfyZ b
1 
1 +N b
(rh   p)dF v(p) = s; (13)
where F v(p) is the distribution in Varian (1980) dened in (1). Given that rg exists uniquely,
it is straightforward to verify that rh exists uniquely for any given b > 0: The result below
establishes the unique existence of some b^ 2 (0; rg) :
Lemma 2 For any given  < 1; if b < rg; then b < rh < rg; 0 < r0h (b) < 1; and there exists
a unique b^ such that b^ = rh

b^

; with b > rh (b) if b > b^ and b < rh (b) if b < b^:
The next result shows that if b 2 (bm; rg) ; where
bm  max
n
b^; s
o
; (14)
then the equilibrium price distribution is exactly F v (p) ; the Varian distribution.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that rg > b > bm: Then, there exists a unique symmetric equilib-
rium outcome in which rms set prices according to F v(p) given by (1), and each rms equi-
librium prot is b1 N . An equilibrium reservation price of the global searchers is rh  rh (b)
given by (13). In equilibrium, local searchers have the same expected surplus as global
searchers, and the presence of local searchers increases all consumerswelfare.
Interestingly, when local searchersreservation price is below rg, global searchers choose
their optimal reservation price above the upper limit of the support for the equilibrium
price distribution. In other words, rms always price strictly below the global searchers
reservation price. While the rmspricing strategy may seem counter-intuitive, it is easier
to understand once the presence of local searchers is taken into account. Since b < rh but
the di¤erence is relatively small; a rm would want to lower its price to b or below in order
to sell to the local searchers it would not be protable for the rm to raise its price to
rh: Consequently the equilibrium price distribution is determined by the reservation price
of the local searchers and is F v (p) :11
Although local searchers reservation price is below that of the global searchers, all
searchers have the same expected search outcomes and expected payo¤s. This is simi-
lar to the case when b exceeds rg by a small amount. The di¤erence is that here rms
change their pricing strategy in response to the reservation price of local searchers, and all
consumers are better o¤ compared to the equilibrium where  = 1: So this is a case where
local searchers exert a positive externality on global searchers.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
Our analysis has shown how the nature of equilibrium changes with b: When b exceeds rg
by a relatively large amount; global searchers set reservation price rf > rg and rms adopt
clustered pricing. When b exceeds rg by a small amount, global searchers set reservation
11Other reservation prices by the global searchers can also support the unique symmetric equilibrium
outcome, such as a reservation price that is slightly below rh: The upper support of the price disstribution
will still be below such a reservation price and thus the same equilibrium outcome will prevail.
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price rg and rms price as if there were no local searchers. When b is lower than rg (but by
a limited amount), global searchersreservation price will be rh < rg; and rms will price
lower than if local searchers were not present.
We next discuss how other parameters of the model, s; ; and ; a¤ect market outcomes.
Let r be global searchersequilibrium reservation price, p the expected market price,  the
equilibrium prot of each rm; w each consumers welfare, and W  aggregate consumer
welfare. We rst consider the e¤ects of search cost s.
Corollary 1 Holding all else constant:
(i) dpds > 0 if b 2 [rg; 11 rg):
(ii) There exist parameter values under which dpds < 0 if b >
rg
1  ; in particular,
dp
ds < 0 if
b >
rg
1  and N = 2:
(iii) dw

ds < 0 for all consumers if b 2 [rg; rg1 ) but there exist parameter values under which
dW 
ds > 0 if b >
rg
1  :
(iv) As s! 0;  does not converge to 0; and price dispersion persists:
When b exceeds rg by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium price distribution is the
same as in Stahl (1989), and a decrease in search cost has the familiar e¤ect on equilibrium
price and consumer welfare, lowering p and raising w. It is surprising, however, that a
reduction in search cost can raise the expected price in the market and reduce aggregate
consumer welfare when b exceeds rg by a large amount. To see the intuition behind this
result, recall that when b > rg1  ; in equilibrium rms randomize between a set of high
prices targeting the local searchers and a set of low prices targeting the global searchers. As
s becomes lower, the global searchers lower their reservation price, reducing the expected
payo¤ from trying to sell to them. Firms thus nd more protable to target the local
searchers, placing a higher probability on the interval of high prices. Consequently, the
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expected price in the market is higher.1213 This can lead to higher expected price for all
consumers, reducing aggregate consumer welfare.14
Price dispersion persists in our model even as s vanishes, because there are local searchers
whose reservation price is b > 0; and b > rg1  as s ! 0 (rg ! 0): In fact, as s ! 0; the
equilibrium price distribution in our model converges to that in Varian (1980) with the
number of uninformed consumers becoming (1  ) (1  ) : The presence of local searchers
also means that a reduction in s may not lower equilibrium rm prot; and for given b > 0;
equilibrium prot remains positive as s vanishes.
Corollary 1 o¤ers an explanation of the puzzling observation that the Internet, which has
substantially reduced search cost, has not signicantly reduced prices and price dispersions
for many products (e.g., Baye and Morgan, 2004; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2006; and
Ellison and Ellison, 2005). Our theory suggests that this can happen if there are local
searchers whose reservation price is above rg. These may be consumers who lack the access
to the new search technology made available by the Internet and hence their search cost
remains high. Thus even as other consumers who search on the Internet have dramatically
reduced their search cost, equilibrium price dispersion remains. In this sense, the so-called
"Digital Divide" is not only an equity issue but also has important implications for market
e¢ ciency.
Next, we consider the e¤ects of changes in the portion of global searchers () among
uninformed consumers: Recall that the equilibrium price distribution is denoted by  () ;
12This result is related to the nding in Stahl (1989) that equilibrium prices are higher with more sellers.
There, as the number of sellers increases, the incentive to attract more informed buyers decrease (since
the probability of being the lowest-priced seller goes down). This increases sellers incentive to target less
informed buyers, increasing prices.
13 In an interesting recent paper, Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2009) identies a di¤erent channel
through which a lower search cost can increase prices. There, a reduction in search cost can lead to a change
in product design that softens price competition, which in turn raises prices.
14Since the global searchers benet from the lower search cost, our numerical examples show that they are
better o¤ from the lower search cost, despite the higher expected price. The local searchers and the informed
consumers are worse o¤ due to the higher prices. Numerical examples show that the higher expected prices
sometimes result in lower aggregate consumer welfare.
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and the equilibrium price distributions in Varian (1980) and in Stahl (1989) are denoted by
F v () and G () ; respectively:
Corollary 2 (i) An increase in  lowers p and ; and benets all consumers when the
higher  moves the parameter region from b > rg1  to
rg
1  > b > rg; and a marginal increase
in  has no e¤ect on market outcomes if bm < b  rg1  : (ii)  (p)! F v (p; b) if ! 0; and
 (p)! G () if ! 1:
As one would expect, an increase in the number of global searchers tends to reduce market
prices and benet consumers. This happens when b  rg1  and an increase in  changes
the nature of the equilibrium price distribution. Numerical analysis suggests that this is
also the case for a marginal increase in  when b > rg1  ; although we have not been able to
show this analytically. However, it is also possible that a higher  does not lower prices, as
in the case when b  rg1  .
To the extent that the portion of local searchers (e.g., consumers who have no access to
computers or the Internet) may decrease over time, or  may increase over time, our result
suggests that as time passes, prices on the Internet might become less dispersed and become
closer to marginal cost.
Next, changes in the portion of informed consumers () have expected e¤ects; as in the
following:
Corollary 3 (i) d

d < 0; and (ii) p! 0 and  ! 0 as ! 1:
Thus, more informed consumers result in lower equilibrium prots. As all consumers
approach to being fully informed, prices approach marginal cost and rm prots approach
zero.
Finally, we can nd out the limiting distribution when N goes to innite.
Corollary 4 As N ! 1;  (p) !  (b) ; the degenerate probability distribution with unit
mass at b.
Therefore, as N grows large, in the limit the equilibrium price distribution collapses to
the local searchers reservation price, consistent with the ndings of Varian (1980) and
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Stahl (1989). Intuitively, as N ! 1; the price distribution G () will concentrate at the
reservation price rg because the probability of being the rm with lowest price diminishes to
zero. The concentration of prices increases the reservation price as search benet decreases,
which in turn increases the incentive for rms to set higher prices. As a result, rg converges
to V and hence b  rg: Therefore, as N ! 1;  (p) = G (p) !  (V ) if b = V; and
 (p) = F v (p)!  (b) if b < V:
5. DISCUSSIONS
Like the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980), the local searchers in our model have
two alternative interpretations. We now discuss the implications of our result, focusing
on the interpretation that the local searchers are boundedly rational they have the same
search cost s as the global searchers but their reservation price is not derived from optimal
sequential search. This connects our analysis closely to a small but growing literature that
considers bounded rationality in the study of industrial organization. Our formal results in
Sections 3 and 4 are all valid under this interpretation for all b 2 (bm; V ]: From Propositions
2 and 3, we have:
Corollary 5 Suppose that the local searchers are boundedly rational in choosing their reser-
vation price b. If the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively small in the
market (in the sense that rg1   b  b^); then the BR searchers will have the same expected
payo¤s as rational searchers, and the equilibrium outcome for all consumers is either the
same as or is better than that when all consumers are fully rational.
Our nding is in contrast to the result in many other models that BR consumers are
always harmed by their non-optimizing behavior in equilibrium (e.g., Armstrong and Chen,
2009; Gabaix and Laibson. 2006; and Spiegler, 2006). Unlike in these models, in our model
a small degree of non-optimizing behavior by some consumers is harmless and can benet
all consumers. Thus, BR searchers can have a positive externality on rational searchers and
informed consumers.
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However, if b > rg1  so that the departure from optimal search is relatively large, non-
optimizing search behavior is costly to the BR searchers, reducing their welfare below that
of the rational searchers. Furthermore, the presence of BR searchers now exerts a negative
externality on rational searchers and informed consumers by encouraging rms to raise
prices. We thus have:
Corollary 6 If b > rg1  so that the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively
large in the market, then the BR searchers will have lower expected surplus than rational
searchers, and their presence makes all consumers worse o¤.
We have conned our analysis to the three cases of b > rg1  ;
rg
1   b  rg; and rg > b  b^.
If b < b^; it can be shown that in equilibrium BR searchers may search multiple sellers. Since
our purpose is to develop a model that bridges Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), with the
local searchers being the uninformed consumers who search only once, we have conned our
analysis to situations where b > b^; so that the BR consumers indeed search only once in
equilibrium, as in Varian (1980).15
6. CONCLUSION
We have developed a simple search model that unies two di¤erent approaches of studying
homogeneous-product markets with imperfect consumer information. Our analysis suggests
that including the two types of searchers from Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) in a single
model yields interesting new insights about oligopolistic pricing. Most strikingly, equilib-
rium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated
by a zero-density gap in the middle; and a reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher
market prices. Under a boundedly rational interpretation for the local searchers, a small
15 If b  b^; the following can be shown: If b < b^ by a medium amount, there is an equilibrium with the
feature that rms randomize between a high-price distribution and a low-price distribution, but this time
the low prices target the BR searchers, whose presence benets other consumers. If b is small enough, the
equilibrium is the same as that in Stahl with the number of informed consumers including the BR searchers,
who will search all sellers and become informed in equilibrium.
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degree of bounded rationality in the market either has no e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes
or benets all consumers while reducing rm prots.
While our mixture-distribution equilibrium contrasts with the standard result in the liter-
ature (e.g., Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) that the equilibrium price distribution is gapless, the
existence of such an equilibrium requires certain conditions. In our specic model, we have
identied plausible conditions under which the equilibrium price distribution does or does
not have a gap. More generally, our analysis suggests that the nature of price distribution
will be sensitive to the specications of consumer search costs or search behavior, as well
as to other market conditions.16
For future research, it would be interesting to extend our model to study markets with
horizontal product di¤erentiation. It would also be interesting to study how rms might
separate the local searchers from the global searchers in order to engage in price discrimina-
tion. Another direction for future research is to extend our model to settings where there is
information imperfection in multiple dimensions, such as in both price and product quality.
It would also be interesting to explore alterntive models of bounded rationality in a search
equilibrium context. Moreover, it would be desirable to investigate empirically the nature
of price dispersions, particularly whether/when prices follow mixture distributioins.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. We verify that F (p; ) is a c.d.f. Since F1(rf ; ) = 1; F2(t2; ) = 0; F1(p; )
and F2(p; ) increase in p; it follows that F (p; ) is continuous and weakly increases in p:
Furthermore, F (t1; ) = (1  )F1(t1; ) = 0; and F (b; ) = 1   + F2(b; ) = 1: Therefore
F (p; ) is a continuous c.d.f.
Step 2. We show that each rm is optimizing following F (p; ); given that other rms
16When the number of rms is large, our mixture-distribution equilibrium can be alternatively interpreted
as an asymmetric equilibrium where  portion of the rms price higher according to F2 whereas 1   
portion of the rms price lower according to F1: This suggests that high-price stores and low-price stores
might coexist persistently, with price dispersion among each type of stores.
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choose prices according to F , local searchersreservation price is b; and global searchers
reservation price is rf : The expected prot when a rm chooses price p is:
(i) If t1 < p  rf ;
 = p
"
(1  ) (1  )
N
+  (1  )
N 1X
i=0
 
N 1
i

N 1 i(1  )i
i+ 1
#
+p
N 1X
i=0

N   1
i

N 1 i(1  )i (1  F1(p; ))i
= p
"
(1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  N
N (1  ) + (+ (1  ) (1  F1(p; )))
N 1
#
;
because the rm sells to (1 )(1 )N of local searchers with probability 1; to
(1 )
i+1 of
global searchers when i other rms also price below rf (which occurs with probability 
N 1
i

N 1 i(1   )i); and also to all informed consumers () when its price is lowest
(which occurs with probability [+ (1  ) (1  F1(p; ))]N 1). The equality above then
follows from operations of combinations.
(ii) If t2  p < b;
 = p

(1  ) (1  )
N
+ [ (1  ) + ]N 1(1  F2(p; ))N 1

;
because the rm sells to (1 )(1 )N of local searchers with probability 1 and to all global
searchers and informed consumers with probability N 1(1   F2(p; ))N 1 (when p is the
lowest price).
(iii) If p = rf ;  = rf (
(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1):
(iv) If p = b;  = b (1 )(1 )N :
Equal prots from (i) and (iii) yield
F1(p;; rf )
=
1 

N 1 +

(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1

rf
p   1
 1N 1
1   ; (15)
which, after substituting rf from (11), yields equation (7), where t1 is given by equation
(9). Equal prots from (ii) and (iv) yield equation (8), where t2 is given by equation (10).
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And equal prots from (iii) and (iv) yield the expression for rf ; equation (11). Note that
t1  rf  t2  b. Therefore, the rm is optimizing choosing prices p 2 [t1; b] according
to F (p; ) : Moreover, global searchers will search optimally, which gives equation (12), and
the assumption that b < 11 V ensures that rf < V .
Step 3. We show the existence of  2 (0; 1) : Substituting rf ; t1; and F1 as functions of
 and b into the left-hand side of equation (12), which can then be denoted as
  (; b)  (1  )
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
F1(p;; rf (; b))dp: (16)
  is a continuous function of ; for any given b (and given all other parameter values):
Thus, the proposed pricing strategy F and the search strategy rf constitute an equilibrium
if there exists some  2 (0; 1) that solves   (; b) = s: Since
@rf (; b)
@b
=
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1 > 0
and for p 2 [t1; rf ]
@F1(p;)
@rf
=
@F1(p;)
@p

  p
rf

>  @F1(p;)
@p
; (17)
we have
@  (; b)
@b
= (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
+ (1  )
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@rf
@rf (; b)
@b
dp
= (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
"
1 +
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@rf
dp
#
> (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
"
1 
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@p
dp
#
= 0:
If  = 0; we would have b = 11 rg from equations (11), (7), and (3). Thus, for b >
1
1 rg,
  (; b) > s if  = 0, and   (; b) = 0 < s if  = 1: Hence for any b 2 ( 11 rg;

1 + 1 

V ];
there exists some  2 (0; 1) that solves   (; b) = s:
Step 4. We establish equilibrium uniqueness. It is straightforward to verify that F is the
only possible symmetric equilibrium price strategy of the game given any . The uniqueness
of the equilibrium is then established if, for any given b;  (b) uniquely solves   (; b) = s;
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which would be true if  (b) is monotonically increasing in b: Rewriting
F1 =
1
1  
h
1 A 1N 1
i
;
where from (15)
A  N 1 +
 
N 1 +
(1  ) (1  )
N
+
(1  )  1  N
N (1  )
!
rf
p
  1

> 0;
we have @A@ > 0 and
@F1
@
=
1
(1  )2
h
1 A 1N 1
i
  1
1  
1
N   1A
1
N 1 1@A
@
=
F1
(1  )  
1
1  
1
N   1
1  (1  )F1
A
@A
@
:
Thus
(1  )@F1
@
  F1 =   1
N   1
1  (1  )F1
A
@A
@
< 0: (18)
Therefore
@  (; b)
@
=  
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
F1(p;; rf (; b))dp+ (1  )
"
@rf (; b)
@
+
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)

@F1
@
+
@F1
@rf
@rf
@

dp
#
=
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)

(1  )@F1
@
  F1(p;; rf (; b))

dp+ (1  )@rf (; b)
@
 
1 +
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1
@rf
dp
!
< 0;
because @rf (;b)@ < 0 from (11), 1 +
R rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1
@rf
dp > 0 from (17), and (1   )@F1@  
F1(p;; rf (; b)) < 0 from (18). It follows that
d (b)
db
=  
@ (;b)
@b
@ (;b)
@
> 0: (19)
Step 5. We show rf > rg by proving the two claims below
Claim 1. rf must be monotonic in b.
Suppose to the contrary that rf is non-monotonic in b. By the continuity of rf in b, there
will be some b 6= ~b associated with some common rf . Suppose b > ~b: Then  > ~ from (19)
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and t1 > ~t1 from (9) and (11). Thus, using (15) for F1,
s = (1  )
Z rf
t1
F1(p;; rf (b))dp
=
Z rf
t1
0@1  "N 1 + (1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  N
N (1  ) + 
N 1
!
rf
p
  1
# 1N 11A dp
<
Z rf
~t1
0@1  "~N 1 + (1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  ~N
N (1  ~) + ~
N 1
!
rf
p
  1
# 1N 11A dp
= (1  ~)
Z rf
~t1
F1

p; ~; rf

~b

dp = s;
a contradiction.
Claim 2. rf cannot be decreasing in b for all b  11 rg.
Suppose to the contrary that rf monotonically decreases in b. Then rf < rg when
b > 11 rg. But, since
(1 N)
1  =
PN 1
n=0 
n,
rf = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1
= b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +  (1  )PN 1n=0 n +NN 1
> b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +  (1  )N +N > rg;
when b > ~b = (1 )(1 )+(1 )N+N(1 )(1 ) rg; a contradiction.
Together, Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply that rf monotonically increases in b; and hence
rf > rg for b > 11 rg:
Finally, F2 < F1; and F1 < G because
G  F1 =   
1   +

N 1 +

(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1

rf
p   1
 1N 1
1  
 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
>   
1   +
1
1  

N 1 +
1  
N

rf
p
  1
 1
N 1
 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
>   
1   +
1
1  
 
N 1
 1
N 1 +
h
1 
N

rf
p   1
i 1
N 1  
h
1 
N (
rg
p   1 )
i 1
N 1
1   > 0:
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Thus F rst-order stochastically dominates G: It follows that the distribution of the min-
imum prices under F (); 1  [1  F ()]N ; also rst-order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution of minimum prices under G () ; 1   [1 G ()]N : Therefore, both the expected
price and the expected minimum price are higher under F than under G; and all consumers
are worse o¤ compared to the situation where  = 1: Local searches have lower surplus
than global searchers, since with positive probability they have di¤erent search outcomes.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given G(p; rg); the global searchers are searching optimally with
reservation price rg: To show that the proposed is an equilibrium, we thus only need to show
that, given b and rg; and given other rms choose G(p; rg); each rm is optimizing choosing
any p 2
h
1 
1+(N 1)rg; rg
i
: For any such price, the rms expected prot is
p
1  
N
+ p (1 G(p; rg))N 1
= p
1  
N
+ p
1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 ) = 1  
N
rg:
Then, the most protable deviation is p = b; because any p > b would lead to zero prot
and any p 2 (rg; b) would result in the same amount of sales as p = b but at a lower price.
However, prot at p = b is
(1  ) (1  )
N
b  (1  ) (1  )
N
1
1  rg =
1  
N
rg:
Therefore the rm is maximizing its prot by choosing its price from G(p; rg); and each
rms equilibrium prot is 1 N rg:
Furthermore, from familiar arguments there can be no other equilibrium price distribu-
tion. The uniqueness of rg then implies that there can be no other symmetric equilibrium.
Since b  rg; local searchers always have the same search outcomes as global searchers;
and since the equilibrium distribution is identical to that when  = 1, the presence of local
searchers has no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. From (13) and (3), we have
rh  
Z b
1 
1 +N b
pdF v(p) = rg  
Z rg
1 
1 +N rg
pdG(p; rg) = s;
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and thus rh < rg since G(p; rg) < F v(p) for b < rg: Also, for b < rg; if rh  b; we would
have
s =
Z b
1 
1 +N b
(rh   p)dF v(p) 
Z b
1 
1 +N b
(b  p)dF v(p)
<
Z rg
1 
1 +N rg
(rg   p)dF v(p) = s;
where the last inequality follows from (4). This is a contradiction. Therefore, if b < rg;
b < rh < rg.
Rewriting (13) as
(rh   b) +
Z b
1 
1 +N b
F v(p)dp = s;
we have
0 < r0h (b) = 1 
d
R b
1 
1 +N b
F v(p)dp
db
= 1  1 
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dF v(p)
db
dp =  
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dF v(p)
dp

 p
b

dp
=
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dF v(p)
dp
p
b

dp <
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dF v(p)
dp
dp = 1:
From 0 < r0h (b) < 1; together from b  rh if b ! rg and b < rh if b ! 0; there is some
b^ 2 (0; rg) that uniquely solves b^ = rh

b^

; with b > rh (b) if b > b^ and b < rh (b) if
b < b^: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, F v(p) is a continuous c.d.f.: Given that all other rms
follow the strategy F v(p) and given r and b, if a rm charges any p 2
h
1 
1 +Nb; b
i
; its
expected prot is
p
1  
N
+ p [1 H(p; b)]N 1 = b1  
N
:
Furthermore, if it prices below 1 1 +Nb or above rh; its expected prot would be lower
than b1 N ; and if it prices between b and rh; since rh  b for b  bm; its expected prot
would be
p
 (1  )
N
 rh (1  )
N
 b

 (1  )
N
= b
1  
N
:
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Thus each rm is optimizing by choosing mixed strategy F v(p):
Next, expecting price distribution F v(p); it is optimal for global searchers to search with
reservation price rh. Therefore the proposed pricing and search strategies indeed constitute
an equilibrium, with  = b1 N ; and there is no other symmetric equilibrium outcome.
Since b < rg; b
1 
N < rg
1 
N ; and thus rm prot is lower than when  = 1: Given rms
equilibrium pricing strategy, local consumers have the same search outcome as the global
searchers, and thus have the same expected surplus in equilibrium.
Finally, since G(p; rg) < F v(p) with b < rg; the expected price is lower under F v(p):
Moreover, since the distributions of the minimum price in the market are 1  [1 G(p; rg)]N
and 1   [1  F v(p)]N ; respectively, which preserves the stochastic ordering, the expected
lowest price is also lower under F v(p): Thus all consumers are better o¤ due to the presence
of the local searchers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) If b 2 [rg; 11 rg); a marginal reduction in s reduces r from (5)
and hence increases G (p; ) from (2), lowering p.
(ii) It su¢ ces to show that dpds < 0 if b >
1
1 rg and N = 2: From Proposition 1, when
N = 2:
p = E [pjF ] = (1  )E [pjF1] + E [pjF2]
= (1  ) (1 + ) (1  ) + 2
2 (1  ) rf ln
rf
t1
+ 

(1  ) (1  )
2 (+  (1  ))b ln
b
t2

=
b (1  ) (1  )
2
ln

(1 + ) (1  ) + 2
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2

+
(1  ) (1  )
2 (+  (1  ))b ln
(1 +    (1  )) (1  ) + 2
(1  ) (1  ) :
Thus
dp
d
=
b (1  )2 (1  ) (1  )2 ( (1  ) + 2)
[(1  ) (1  + 2) + 2] [1 + +  (1  )] [(1  ) (1 + ) + 2] > 0:
(20)
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From (12) and (10),
s = (1  ) (rf   E [pjF1]) = (1  )

rf   (1 + ) (1  ) + 2
2 (1  ) rf ln
rf
t1

= b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2  
b (1  ) (1  )
2
ln

(1 + ) (1  ) + 2
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2

:
Thus
ds
d
=   2b (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) (1  + + )
[1 + +  (1  )] (    2+   1)2 < 0: (21)
Therefore, from (20), (21), and the fact that there is one-to-one match between s and 
from the proof of Proposition 1, we have dds < 0 and
dp
ds
=
dp
d
d
ds
< 0:
(iii) A marginal reduction in s increases welfare for all consumers if b 2 [rg; 11 rg); since
it lowers both p and the expected minimum price in the market; but it can reduce W  if
b > 11 rg: For example, if N = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:5; V = 6; b = 5; we have W
 = 4: 736 4 if
s = 0:8 while W  = 4: 728 6 if s = 0:4.
(iv) As s ! 0; rg ! 0 and hence b > 11 rg for any given b > 0. Thus, the equilibrium
price distribution will be F (p:) as s ! 0: Moreover, from (12), @@s < 0; and  ! 1 as
s! 0: Thus, as s! 0; F (p:)! F2 (p:) ; which is a non-degenerate c.d.f. , and each rms
equilibrium prot is (1 )(1 )N b > 0: Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) First, suppose initially b > 11 rg and the equilibrium price
distribution is F (p; ) : A higher  can move the parameter region to 11 rg > b > rg;
changing the equilibrium price distribution to G (p; ) > F (p; ) ; resulting in lower p and 
while beneting all consumers (who may also save on search costs in equilibrium). Second,
if bm < b  rg1  ; then the equilibrium price distribution is either G () or F v(); which is
independent of :
(ii)As ! 0; b > 11 rg if b > rg; and from Proposition 1
 (p) = F (p)! 1 

(1  )
N
(
b
p
  1)
 1
N 1
= F v (p) :
On the other hand, as  ! 1; we have b < rg1  ; rms will ignore the local searchers and
 ()! G () : Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 3. (i) for , we have three possible cases. If  = (1 )N b or
 = (1 )(1 )N b; then obviously
d
d < 0: If 
 = 1 N rg; then since
drg
d < 0 from (5), we
also have d

d < 0: (ii) as ! 1; the equilibrium price distribution converges to 0 (marginal
cost), and hence p! 0 and  ! 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4. First, we show that, as N ! 1; rg ! V: The proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 4 in Stahl (1989). Note that, for p  rg  V;

rg
p   1

1 


is bounded away from zero. Thus, as N ! 1, from (2), G () ! 0: That is, as N ! 1;
G () concentrates at its upper bound: It follows that, as N ! 1; for any " > 0; we can
always nd some p0 arbitrarily close to rg such that G (p0) < : Suppose " is such that
p0 = rg   s+ V: Then, as N !1;Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp =
Z rg
p0
G(p; rg)dp+
Z p0
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp
<
 
rg   p0

+ 

p0   1  
1 + (N   1)rg

<
 
rg   p0

+ V = s;
which implies that the benet from search is smaller than s. Therefore, as N ! 1;
reservation price rg must approach to V:
Next, Since b  V by assumption, we must have b  rg as N ! 1: If b = V; as
N ! 1;  (p) = G () !  (V ) : If b < V; as N ! 1; b < rg and  (p) = F v(p): But
for p < b;

b
p   1

1 


is bounded away from zero. Thus, as N ! 1, from (??),
F v(p)! 0: Therefore, if b < V ,  (p) = F v(p)!  (b) as N !1: Therefore  (p)!  (b)
as N !1:Q.E.D.
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